Ethnic conflict, authoritarian regimes complicate decision process

Multiple clans complicate business

The Caspian Basin is populated by many people groups that identify themselves by clan and kin instead of nationality.

PART II: This is the second of a four-part series dealing with the key issues of the Caspian Sea Basin. Part I dealt with Caspian geology and reserve potential. The series is a summary of the James A. Baker Institute's Caspian Basin Policy Study.

The newly independent states of Central Asia continue to be turbulent entities. They carry a legacy of Soviet policy designed to make the population easier to control. People groups were mixed and both cultures and religions were suppressed. The new nations continue to organize themselves and find common ground internally.

The legacies of ethnic conflict, social turbulence, and political repression left from the Soviet era have hindered economic development and international investment. Corruption at the highest levels in several countries in the region has already widened the gap between the political elite and the indigenous population that is suffering from dislocation, poverty, and disease.

If disparities accelerate, as seems likely, the internal instability of the region may increase. This will further hinder investment and the steady flow of oil from the region.

Ethnic complexity

The people of Central Asia do not define their identities exclusively through state boundaries. Ties to clan, kin, region of birth, or location of residence are at least as critical and sometimes more important. The new nations were the last to declare independence from the Soviet Union because of four factors:

National self-awareness was low
Mixed demographic and religious makeup
Challenge of interdependence among the new states
Challenge of dependence on the former Soviet state.

Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzistan) and Kazakhs (Kazakhstan) were considered one people in the early 1900's. The Kazaks further define themselves by hordes (zhus): the Lesser, Middle, and Greater Hordes. The Greater Horde has had a disproportionate lock on positions of power since independence.

The Uzbeks (Uzbekistan) never had a state, but resided between two rivers, a very fertile area. Tajikistan was formed from two former emirates - Bokhara and Kokand. Both Uzbecks and Tajiks focus on large extended family connections, mahalle, and are effectively self-generated local governments. Reverence for ancestry and lineage is common throughout all of Central Asia.

Turkmens (Turkmenistan) define themselves by five major clans. The clan structure continues to determine a great deal of local politics.

Molding the states

Since the outset of independence, the region's leaders have struggled with the task of strengthening the weak sense of nationhood. The Soviet-trained presidents took the collapse of the Soviet Union as synonymous with the national liberation. Each of these men perceived their new states to be he national homelands of the community whose name they bore. As a result, the three foundations of their nation-building strategies became:

Resuscitation of the indigenous languages
Revival of religion
Re-interpretation of history.

Institution of these policies has created secondary problems, primarily the alienation of needed Russian technical professionals. Many are returning to Russia leaving a severe problem in their former positions.

Authoritarian states

The authoritarian nature of the new states carries the seed of future problems. The common denominator in the region consists of the lack of meaningful competitive elections and division of powers. This creates succession problems and the potential for sudden political change.

The vigor with which any attempt at political opposition has been rooted has preserved a kind of macro-stability. Stability really means preservation of the privileges of the existing elites and of the status quo. This makes it all but impossible for new political figures and ideas to enter the national arena. other than in catastrophic and revolutionary ways. By attempting to eliminate the ups-and-downs of messy democracy, the leaders have made it more likely that political change, when it comes, will be convulsive and violent.

The spread of corruption and the concentration of wealth have created a vicious circle, which is likely to keep the majority of people in poverty. The failure to create a broad property-owning class has also precluded the generation of a stable tax-paying class, thus dramatically decreasing government revenues.

The money, which the new system has brought to the tiny layer of new rich, has made them more impervious to the leaders and the system which allowed them to get rich. The result of tax avoidance has been a spiraling crisis of emptying the public coffers and non-payment of wages and pensions, which in turn led to demonstrations and strikes in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Corruption in the region does not appear to be as rampant as in certain parts of Africa or the Middle East.

Religion

At present, the threat of the revival of Islamic religion to the political and economic environment in Central Asia and Azerbaijan is remote. Muslims in the region tend to be divided by sect and degree of secularization. Weak leadership and organization have hindered political activities.

No organized, broad-based monolithic fundamentalist movement exists today in Central Asia or Azerbaijan. No charismatic Islamic politicians have emerged to rally the population around a political banner.

Iran does not appear significantly involved in spreading its religious influence into Azerbaijan and has displayed more pragmatic economic interests.

Reference

"Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucus, A Political, Economic and Cultural Study," James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Houston, 1998.