DRILLING & PRODUCTION

Eldon Ball • Houston

More information on Macondo

The reports are coming, as we expected they would, and not surprisingly, they don’t agree in every detail.

We’re referring, of course, to ongoing investigations into the possible contributing factors – and measures to prevent future similar events – regarding the Macondo well explosion and fire in the US Gulf of Mexico earlier this year.

A joint industry task force has made some equipment and procedural recommendations, without attempting to determine cause by specific party. Almost on the same day, BP released a report that concludes that the accident was the result of a number of failures, shared by many of the companies participating in the Macondo project.

The Joint Industry Task Force to Address Subsea Well Control and Containment, chaired by Charlie Williams of Shell and with over 30 participants, says that the primary focus of its investigation is and will be on single wells in deepwater and on operations that can occur after a BOP has failed and ROV shut-in attempts have failed or are not possible.

The task force addresses five key areas of focus for GoM deepwater operations:

• Well containment at the seafloor
• Intervention and containment within the subsea well
• Subsea collection and surface processing and storage
• Continuing R&D
• Relief wells.

The task force has made 29 recommendations, and says that the industry must:

• Own and provide containment technology and capability
• Develop capability to remove the lower marine riser platform (LMRP) from the blowout preventer (BOP) using a surface intervention vessel and remotely operated vehicle (ROV)
• Develop new methods to release the LMRP without riser tension
• Develop the capability to remove a damaged BOP for installation of a new BOP in special situations
• Develop the capability to regain full functionality of the BOP stack.

The JITF also recommended that the industry:

• Be able to repair or replace non-functioning control pods to be able to regain full functionality of BOP stack (ROV intervention provides limited functionality).
• Provide additional and more effective methods of connecting to and controlling BOPs with ROVs.
• Assess industry capability and conduct in-situ testing to determine what new technology and capability needs to be developed to remove a debris field and cut equipment like risers. Develop new equipment and capability as determined by testing.
• Assure necessary wellhead structural support via design and practices in the event of strong side forces from drifting connected rigs and riser collapse from rig sinking.
• Evaluate new and evolving ideas for subsea containment including open capture devices that would have separation capability. R&D should be a key part of the containment company in which all industry can participate. All the R&D programs will work collaboratively with appropriate organizations like RPSEA and Deepstar to ensure maximum leverage in the R&D program.

In future investigations, “Consideration will also be given to containment of open casing or casing leaks,” the group says. “Although some technical solutions can be applied to subsea producing wells and templates, these will be focused on in future work. The review will not include blow out preventers and control systems such as emergency disconnect systems, autoshear systems, and deadman systems, all of which are covered in the Offshore Equipment task force.”

Participating in the Subsea Well Control and Containment Task Force were AMPOL, Apache, API, Anadarko, ATP, Baker Hughes, BHP Billiton Petroleum, Chevron, Cobalt, ConocoPhillips, Delmar Systems, Diamond Offshore Drilling, Dorado Deep, ENI, ExxonMobil, FMC Technologies, GE Oil and Gas, Halliburton, Helix, IPAA, McMoRan Exploration, Newfield, NOV, Petrobras, Schlumberger, Shell, Statoil, USOGA, and Wild Well Control. The complete report can be viewed atwww.noia.org.

BP says: ‘Series of failures’

Meanwhile, a report released by BP concludes that decisions made by “multiple companies and work teams” contributed to the Macondo well explosion and fire.

According to the report, the accident arose from “a complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces.”

BP says the report was based on information available to the investigating team. It notes that additional relevant information may be forthcoming – for example, when Halliburton’s samples of the cement used in the well are released for testing; and when the rig’s blow-out preventer is fully examined after it has been recovered from the seabed. There will also be additional information from the multiple ongoing US government investigations.

The report is based on a four-month investigation led by Mark Bly, BP’s head of Safety and Operations, and conducted independently by a team of over 50 technical and other specialists drawn from inside BP and externally.

Commenting on the report, which he commissioned immediately after the Macondo explosion, BP’s outgoing chief executive Tony Hayward said: “It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy.”

The investigation report is available online atwww.bp.com, together with an accompanying video.

Cause of fire under investigation

With Mariner Energy reporting the fire is no longer burning on its Vermilion block 380 platform in the Gulf of Mexico, attention turns to determining the cause of the event.

“It is too early to know what caused the fire,” said Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal. “The Coast Guard is conducting interviews to determine that.”

Mariner also is investigating, it said. Production from the shallow water platform in 380 ft (116 m) of water was shut off before the fire started and even before the crew left, Mariner said. During the last week of August, production from this facility reportedly averaged approximately 9.2 MMcf/d of natural gas and 1,400 bbl of oil and condensate.

The Eighth US Coast Guard District command center responded to a call from a pilot aboard a Bristow helicopter, stating that 13 people were in the water wearing immersion suits. Response from New Orleans and Houston included:

• Five MH-65C rescue helicopters and crews from Coast Guard Air Station New Orleans
• Four MH-65C rescue helicopters and crews from Coast Guard Air Station Houston
• HC-144 Guardian aircraft from Coast Guard Aviation Training Center Mobile, Alabama
• Coast Guard CuttersDecisive, Skipjack, Manta, and Harry Claiborne. 

The crew of theCrystal Clear offshore supply vessel pulled 13 people from the water near the platform and transferred them to a nearby rig.

Three of the Coast Guard helicopters and the supply boatCougar transported all 13 people ashore to the Terrebonne General Medical Center in Houma, Louisiana, where none were reported to have sustained serious injury.

Mariner Energy, the owner of the platform, deployed three firefighting vessels to the scene, and said that the fire was out by mid-afternoon.